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I. INTRODUCTION 
In whose interests are corporations governed?  In whose 
interests should they be governed?  These foundational questions 
in corporate law have been debated since at least the Berle-Dodd 
exchange in the 1930s.1  Most American commentators have 
asserted a simple answer: the interests of shareholders. 
The debate flared up in the 1980s as states began to pass 
corporate constituency statutes.  These statutes allow corporate 
officers and directors to take into account the interests of a variety 
of corporate stakeholders in carrying out their fiduciary duties to 
the corporation.  The statutes suggest that a corporation should, or 
at least may, be run in the interests of more groups than just 
shareholders.  The corporate constituency statutes therefore 
threaten decades of American thinking about the governance of 
corporations.  As a result, many scholarly papers have appeared 
attacking or defending the constituency statutes. 
On their face, constituency statutes seem attractive to someone 
with an interest in employee involvement in corporate governance.  
However, the statutes were passed in response to the takeover wave 
of the ’80s, and many commentators have charged that their main 
intent and effect is to help entrench incumbent managers.  This 
aspect of the statutes is far from attractive (unless you are an 
incumbent manager).  This article tries to sort out these conflicting 
perspectives.  I ultimately conclude that while there are some 
decent arguments for constituency statutes, and they are not as 
harmful as many of their opponents feared, they are, all in all, not a 
good idea.  They are a poor substitute for direct employee 
involvement in corporate governance. 
This article provides a simple, formal model of the interaction 
among managers, shareholders, and employees in governing a 
business organization.  Most formal work in corporate governance 
focuses only on the relationship between managers and 
shareholders.  There has been relatively little formal modeling that 
includes employees as an important constituency in governance.  
To ask questions about constituency statutes and employee 
governance, one must extend that traditional framework. 
Section II examines the constituency statutes and the scholarly 
 
 1. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Power in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932). 
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literature on them.  It also examines related literature on the 
effects of takeovers on employees and on employee involvement in 
corporate governance. 
Section III presents the basic formal model.  A manager 
chooses how much effort to undertake, which affects both the total 
output of the firm and benefits personal to the manager.  The 
manager also chooses how much of the total output to allocate to 
employees rather than shareholders.  A variety of mechanisms 
induce the manager to take into account the effects of output 
received on both shareholders and employees, but not fully.  As a 
result, the manager tends to set effort too low. 
Section IV extends the model to add in the effects of a 
takeover threat.  If the amount of firm output allocated to 
shareholders is lowered, the possibility of a takeover increases, and 
if a takeover occurs, the manager is punished.  As a result, the 
manager both increases her effort level and allocates a greater 
fraction of output to shareholders.  Shareholders are better off, 
while the effect on employees is ambiguous. 
Section V then considers the effect of existing constituency 
statutes.  These statutes allow managers to take defensive actions 
that reduce the threat of a takeover, claiming such actions benefit 
other constituencies.  The effect of this use of the statutes as a 
shield for managers is to reduce both managerial effort and the 
amount of output allocated to shareholders.  Shareholders are 
worse off, while the effect on employees is ambiguous. 
Section VI models employee involvement in corporate 
governance.  It does so by assuming that employees have some 
ability to punish or eliminate managers with whom they are 
unhappy.  The possibility of such punishment occurring increases 
as the amount of output that employees receive decreases.  As with 
a takeover threat, this mechanism increases managerial effort.  
Unlike takeovers, this mechanism induces managers to allocate 
more output to employees as opposed to shareholders.  Thus, 
employees are better off, while the effect on shareholders is 
ambiguous. 
Section VII sets out the final variant of the formal model.  This 
involves using constituency statutes as a sword against management, 
rather than a shield.  Employees, shareholders, or perhaps others 
can sue managers.  The chance of such suit increases as total 
output decreases.  This mechanism is intermediate between 
takeovers and employee governance in terms of its distributive 
3
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effects, although probably  empirically weaker than either in terms 
of its effect on managerial effort. 
Section VIII concludes with a discussion of the formal model, 
relating it to the issues from the literature discussed in section II.  It 
suggests several conclusions: 
• Economic models of corporate governance, which 
have focused mainly on managers and shareholders, 
should take into account a variety of other 
stakeholder groups—sections III through VII add 
employees to the model. 
• While many commentators have concluded that 
shareholder gains in hostile takeovers do not come in 
part at the expense of employees, that issue is far from 
conclusively decided.  While the literature has focused 
on employee losses through lowered employment or 
wage levels, changes in working conditions and other 
intangibles should be examined as well. 
• There is a redistributive argument in favor of a 
fiduciary duty to employees.  Serving as agents for 
shareholders may help employees, which we want to 
encourage if we think employees deserve a greater 
slice of the pie. 
• While a revised fiduciary duty and employee 
governance may both help tilt the playing field toward 
employees, the revised fiduciary duty does so at the 
cost of lessened discipline of managers, whereas 
employee involvement in governance may help 
control managerial opportunism.  In other words, 
while a broadened fiduciary duty may help distribute 
income from shareholders to employees, it does so at 
the cost of reduced efficiency; employee governance 
may redistribute income and power while improving 
efficiency.  Thus, employee involvement in corporate 
governance is more desirable than constituency 
statutes. 
II. THE LITERATURE 
A.  The Statutes 
The first corporate constituency statute was passed in 1983 in 
4
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Pennsylvania.  A total of thirty states now have some variant of a 
corporate constituency statute.2  Under these statutes, a 
corporation’s officers and directors are allowed to give weight to 
the interests of enumerated groups other than shareholders in the 
performance of their fiduciary duties.  The statutes differ along a 
variety of dimensions.  For example, they differ as to which 
constituent groups are included.  All statutes mention employees 
and customers; other groups mentioned include suppliers, 
creditors, local communities, and the state and national economies.  
Most, though not all, statutes specify that directors may consider 
the long-term as well as the short-term interest of the corporation.3 
The statutes are generally vague as to how directors should 
weigh the interests of varying groups.  A few specify that no single 
interest may dominate; most do not even say that much.4  In a few 
states the statutes apply only in the context of a potential change in 
control.5  In almost all of the states the statutes are permissive, not 
mandatory.  That is, directors may take the interests of the 
enumerated groups into account, but they are not required to.6  In 
several states the enumerated groups (other than shareholders) are 
explicitly denied standing to sue under the statute; in other states 
the lack of standing appears implicit.7  In several states, a 
corporation either must opt in for the statute to apply, or may opt 
out.8 
Of note in the provisions just listed is the permissive nature of 
the statutes in almost all states and the lack of standing of 
constituent group members to sue under the statutes.  These 
features lend credence to the charge that the statutes reduce the 
disciplinary pressure of shareholder suits on directors without a 
concomitant increase in pressure from other groups.  The statutes 
are a shield for managers, not a sword for employees or other non-
shareholder groups. 
To date, it appears that constituency statutes have had very 
little use in the courtroom.  Few court cases have even mentioned 
constituency statutes, and the statutes do not seem to have been 
 
 2. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False 
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 95 (1999). 
 3. Id. at 97. 
 4. Id. at 98. 
 5. Id. at 100. 
 6. Id. at 101. 
 7. See id. at 108. 
 8. See id. at 101-02. 
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decisive for the outcome in cases that do mention such statutes.9  
Of course, whether the statutes have affected actual behavior is a 
more difficult question. 
One possible reason that constituency statutes appear to have 
had little visible impact is that they were adopted at the same time 
that states also adopted other anti-takeover statutes.  Perhaps even 
more importantly, corporations adopted a variety of anti-takeover 
devices, such as poison pills, staggered boards, elimination of 
written consents, supermajority provisions, interested shareholder 
provisions, and the like.10  Common law in the leading corporate 
law state, Delaware, has largely allowed boards to adopt these 
measures with little interference.  Thus, directors and officers have 
found a variety of means to defend their interests.  When pressed 
in court, they generally have been able to defend those means 
without resort to constituency statutes.  If managers can so defend 
their actions without using constituency statutes, they prefer to do 
so, as admitting in court that an action is defensible only by 
reference to groups other than shareholders is not likely to help 
the corporation’s share price. 
B.  Arguments Against and For the Statutes 
The traditional view in American corporate law has been that 
the fiduciary duties of corporate directors run to the shareholders 
of the corporation.11  There have been times when that was 
debated, most notably the Berle-Dodd debate of the 1930s.12  There 
are doctrines that to a degree soften shareholder dominance.  For 
instance, corporate charitable giving is allowed; it is defended as 
being in the long-term interest of the corporation.13  In Unocal, the 
Delaware Supreme Court left some room for the consideration of 
“ ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders,”14 although it does not 
appear that a decision can be defended if it hurts shareholders.  
The dominant view, though, clearly has been that directors and 
officers are to run the corporation in the interests of shareholders, 
 
 9. See id. at 108. 
 10. See id. at 109; Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 38 (1992). 
 11. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 499, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). 
 12. See Berle, supra note 1; Dodd, supra note 1. 
 13. See JESSE H. CHOPER et al., CASES AND MATERIAL ON CORPORATIONS 40-41 
(5th ed. 2000). 
 14. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
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and shareholders alone. 
Corporate constituency statutes challenge that dominant view.  
It is therefore no surprise that many have opposed them.15  The 
traditional argument for the dominant view is that shareholders are 
the owners of the corporation.  Hence they have the right to expect 
that their property is managed in their interest.16  This traditional 
argument is in considerable tension with the contractarian point of 
view, which has come into vogue with the infusion of economic 
thought into corporate law scholarship.  This view portrays the 
corporation as a nexus of contracts between a variety of parties that 
interact through the corporation, potentially including all of the 
groups mentioned in corporate constituency statutes.  The 
corporation is merely a convenient legal fiction, which may help 
structure these interactions.  The question for corporate law, on 
this approach, is what set of legal rules provides the most efficient 
set of incentives for the parties.  Particular attention is paid to the 
ways in which laws may help constrain the potential opportunism of 
managers in a large public corporation.  Under this approach, 
there is nothing necessarily special about the status of shareholders 
as owners of the corporation.  That label simply begs all of the 
interesting questions about the incentives different potential legal 
rules provide.17 
Although contractarianism calls into question the traditional 
argument for a shareholder-only fiduciary duty, it leads to several 
arguments of its own for that position.  Shareholders are the 
residual claimants for a corporation.  They receive what is left of a 
corporation’s earnings after all other contractually required 
 
 15. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for 
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON 
L. REV. 23 (1991); James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency 
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against 
Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996); Committee 
on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential For Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 
2253 (1990).  There is a fairly large literature on constituency statutes, which I 
only sample here.  My point in this section is simply to give a quick sense of some 
of the major arguments made for and against constituency statutes and corporate 
governance, in order to set the stage for the argument I make in the following 
sections. 
 16. See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C.L. REV. 
283, 288-89 (1998). 
 17. See Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: 
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1204 
(1991). 
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payments are made.  Only residual claimants have the proper 
incentive to maximize the total net value that a corporation creates; 
holders of fixed claims only care about ensuring that the 
obligations to them are fulfilled.  Because shareholders bear the 
risk that a corporation faces, they need to be able to control its 
decisions.18 
One problem with this argument is that shareholders are 
frequently not the only residual claimants.  Employees may well be 
residual claimants too.  Employees may possess skills and 
knowledge that are specific to their particular corporation and of 
little or no value if they were to become employed elsewhere.  To 
the extent that this is so, employees, like shareholders, have an 
interest whose value varies with the long-term value of the 
corporation.19  Another problem with this approach is that the law 
does not really treat shareholders as residual claimants.  
A related argument is that, as residual claimants, shareholders 
care about a uniquely wide range of managerial decisions 
concerning the corporation.  It is not possible to completely 
contract over all these decisions.  Although a variety of other 
mechanisms protect the interests of shareholders thus exposed, a 
court-imposed fiduciary duty helps protect shareholders further.20  
The response is that employees also care about a wide range of 
decisions within the corporation, and are similarly unable to 
completely contract over them.21  Some contractarians argue that 
employees care about a more limited range of decisions than 
shareholders, particularly employment decisions, wages and 
benefits, and some aspects of working conditions.  They also argue 
that employees can protect themselves better contractually.22  
However, it would appear that quite a wide range of decisions 
within a corporation affect the well-being of employees.  “Working 
conditions” covers most of what goes on within a corporation.  
Most adult Americans spend a large number of hours working in a 
corporation; what goes on during that time is of intense interest to 
 
 18. See Macey, supra note 15, at 26-31. 
 19. See Greenfield, supra note 16, at 305-08; Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (2002). 
 20. See Macey, supra note 15, at 36-39; STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 424-26 (2002). 
 21. See generally Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 15; see also Stout, 
supra note 19, at 1196; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory 
of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 318-22 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout]. 
 22. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 428-29. 
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them.  Indeed, on its face it would appear that employees, who 
unlike shareholders are not diversified, are more seriously exposed 
to the consequences of managerial decisions than are shareholders 
and have fewer disciplinary mechanisms available to them.  (One 
consequence is that, like managers and creditors, employees are 
likely to prefer lower-risk decisions than shareholders would 
prefer).  The ability of many, indeed most, American workers today 
to protect their interests contractually is quite questionable.23 
Another major argument for a shareholder-only duty is that a 
more diffuse duty owed to many groups would make the fiduciary 
duty of little value to anyone.  The more groups who receive the 
benefit of such a duty, the more likely it is that the interests of 
those groups will conflict.24  Where interests conflict, managers may 
play one group off against another in defending their actions.  
Courts will have a hard time aggregating conflicting interests, and 
hence will go along with the managers’ defense.  Why, then, focus 
on shareholders only, as opposed to some other group?  It may be 
easier to measure returns to shareholders than returns to other 
groups.25  Fiduciary duties have their most legitimate bite in 
situations where the interests of corporate managers go against the 
interests of all other stakeholder groups, and hence the conflicting 
interest problem does not arise.  The application of a fiduciary duty 
to shareholders in circumstances where the interests of various 
stakeholders (other than managers) collide is a less legitimate use 
of fiduciary duty.26 
I find the last-mentioned “too-many-masters” argument the 
most compelling of all those made against constituency statutes.  It 
may well explain why the statutes came into being in the first place.  
The statutes were passed in the context of the hostile takeover wave 
of the 1980s.  In many states, the management of embattled 
corporations was the impetus for the statutes.  This history helps 
explain why the statutes are permissive rather than mandatory.  On 
the other hand, at least some observers believe that other corporate 
constituencies, especially employees (and particularly unions) did 
 
 23. See O’Connor, supra note 17, at 1214-17; Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 
318-22. 
 24. See O’Connor, supra note 17, at 1214-17; Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 
318-22.; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 421. 
 25. See Stout, supra note 19, at 1200. 
 26. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV.  579, 592-94 (1992). 
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support the statutes once they were raised as an issue.27  The 
takeovers of the ’80s seem to have caused much anxiety for many 
employees and their political supporters, which may have made the 
statutes popular.  An important question is thus the extent and 
frequency to which hostile takeovers go against the interests of 
employees. 
C.  The Effects of Takeovers 
A related literature has considered the effects of hostile 
takeovers on various corporate stakeholder groups.28  Takeovers 
tend to generate a great deal of wealth for the shareholders of 
target companies.  A major question has been whether this 
increased wealth is due to enhanced productivity and efficiency, or 
whether it comes in part at the expense of other stakeholders. 
Of most interest here is the claim that perhaps some of the 
gains to target shareholders come at the expense of the employees 
of the target corporation.  One widely cited article by Andrei 
Shleifer and Lawrence Summers posited that hostile takeovers may 
serve as ways to break implicit contracts between corporations and 
their employees.29  Such contracts may exist to help overcome 
incentive problems created by employee investment in firm-specific 
human capital.  Such investment leaves employees vulnerable to 
opportunism by management, which may not increase wages as 
promised in response to the investment.  Although there may be 
other mechanisms, such as corporate reputation, to deal with this 
problem, Shleifer and Summers suggested that corporations may 
instill a culture and set of values in managers so that they care 
about how their decisions affect employees and do not want to 
break implicit contracts with them, even when it may be in the 
shareholder’s interest to do so.  Managers loyal to employees, in 
other words, may act as a corporate commitment device.  Hostile 
takeovers, which replace such loyal managers with ones who have 
no ties to existing employees, may breach that commitment.  An 
example may be the classic case of Cheff v. Mathes,30 where 
management bought back shares from a potential hostile acquirer 
 
 27. See Springer, supra note 2, at 95-96. 
 28. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. 
Auerbach ed., 1988). 
 29. See id. at 41-42. 
 30. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
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allegedly to alleviate the fears of its sales force.  That “allegedly” 
points to the core problem in this area—it could be that the real 
point of the share buyback was to protect the current managers. 
The Shleifer and Summers article led to much comment and 
debate, but not all that much systematic empirical investigation.  
Many anecdotal tales support the story of takeovers leading to 
drastic cuts in employment and/or wages.  However, there is little 
statistical evidence supporting the claim that such anecdotes are 
typical.31  Indeed, the few empirical studies on point suggest no 
tendency for hostile takeovers to result in lower wages or 
employment within the target corporations.32  However, one study 
by Brian Becker does suggest that takeovers may lead to worsened 
work conditions for employees.33  However, Becker reaches this 
result by examining the differential size of takeover premiums in 
unionized and non-unionized target firms and finding the 
premiums are greater in unionized firms.  He reasons that unions 
help employees achieve better work conditions, and that the 
premiums are higher in unionized firms because the takeovers help 
shareholders take back those employee gains.34  The point is very 
interesting, but the empirical evidence he presents is too indirect 
to be confident in his conclusion.  Perhaps the difference between 
union and non-union firms is due to differences in work 
conditions, but perhaps there are other reasons for the union/non-
union differences.  More direct measures of working conditions 
would be preferable, though difficult to obtain. 
Oliver Williamson raised another issue in a comment on the 
Shleifer and Summers article. 35 Shleifer and Summers posit that 
there are managers who loyally stick by employees even where 
immediate corporate incentives suggest they should not.  Such 
behavior may be an optimal form of assuring implicit contracts with 
the employees, but it may instead be an instance of managerial 
 
 31. See O’Connor, supra note 17, at 1200-02. 
 32. See Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisition on 
Labor, in TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988); 
David Neumark & Steven Sharpe, Rents and Quasi-Rents in the Wage Structure: 
Evidence for Hostile Takeovers; Joshua Rosett, Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain 
Takeover Premium?: The Evidence on Contract Wages, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 263 (1990). 
 33. Brian I. Becker, Union Rents As a Source of Takeover Gains Among Target 
Shareholders, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REV. 3 (1995). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comment, in TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
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opportunism.  Managers who value a quiet life may make overly 
generous concessions to employees.  The discipline imposed by 
takeovers may induce management to roll back those concessions.  
If the firm survives as a result of some employee losses, the 
remaining employees may be better off. 
Thus, it is unclear whether or not hostile takeovers, or the 
threat thereof, have significantly hurt employee well-being.  If they 
have, it is not clear whether this is due to a socially suboptimal 
reneging on implicit contracts or rather to an all-in-all beneficial 
tightening of organizational slack.  One possibility is that takeovers 
lead to worsened working conditions for employees, for which they 
are not adequately compensated by increased wages.  The change 
in working conditions may indeed lead to a net increase in 
efficiency (measured in the Kaldor-Hicks sense),36 but may be a loss 
to employees.  I model this possibility in section IV. 
D.  Employee Governance 
Recognizing a fiduciary duty in favor of employees is an 
indirect way of trying to ensure that corporations are governed in 
part in the interest of employees.  A direct route is to have 
employees themselves involved in corporate governance.  This 
could take the form of employee share ownership, electing 
employee representatives to the board of directors, employee 
involvement in quality circles, work councils, or the like.  There is 
scattered but somewhat substantial literature on employee 
governance, with much debate over its likely effects.37 
Through their jobs employees gain much information about 
how things are going within a corporation, and how they might go 
better.  Employees often have a good sense of which managers are 
doing a good job, and which are not.  On many matters employees 
are likely to be better informed than the scattered small 
shareholders of a public corporation.  This may make employees 
more effective monitors of managers than shareholders.38  
 
 36. That is, those who gain are able to compensate those who lose and still be 
better off after the compensation, although this potential compensation need not 
actually take place. 
 37. For a recent selection of related work, see MARGARET M. BLAIR & MARK J. 
ROE, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1999).  For a good earlier paper, see 
Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159 (1991). 
 38. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, 17 J. OF 
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 133 (1985).  Eugene Fama has argued that lower level 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/1
MCDONNELL-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  7:23 PM 
2004]                             CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY                           1239 
Employees, who after all work together daily, may also be better 
able to overcome collective action problems, which notoriously 
plague scattered shareholders of a public corporation. 
Employee governance may also be an effective commitment 
device to induce employees to invest in firm-specific human capital.  
I described above the incentive problems that may stop employees 
from making such investments.  If the employees are assured that 
decisions will be made with their interests in mind, they are likely 
to be less worried about any possible holdup problem that may 
arise after they invest in firm-specific human capital.39 
Employee governance may also be an effective motivational 
device.  If such governance increases employee loyalty to the 
corporation, they may be induced to work harder and better with 
less monitoring of their effort or with lower wages.  They may also 
be more likely to engage in mutual monitoring of their fellow 
employees.40 
Some also advocate employee governance for non-efficiency 
reasons.  Such governance may shift the distribution of income and 
wealth more in favor of employees, which would please those of an 
egalitarian bent.  Employee governance may be valued for its own 
sake—both for psychological reasons such as reducing alienation 
and increasing work satisfaction, and for philosophical reasons tied 
to the value of democracy.41 
Despite these potential advantages, employee governance is 
not widely observed.  There are debates as to why, but skeptics have 
pointed to a number of potential disadvantages.  External investors 
in both the bond and equity markets may be reluctant to invest in 
employee-governed corporations.  If employee governance is 
linked to employee ownership, this may leave employees badly 
 
managers are often good monitors of higher level managers.  See Eugene F. Fama, 
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 293 (1980). 
 39. See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 
(1993); Blair & Stout, supra note 21.  Employees may invest in firm-specific human 
capital by, e.g., the expenditure of valuable time learning information and 
procedures that are specific to the firm. 
 40. See Gregory Dow & Louis Putterman, Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor: An 
Assessment of Proposed Explanations, in BLAIR & ROE, supra note 37, at 25-26; Eugene 
Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL. ECON. 801 
(1992). 
 41. See Brett McDonnell, ESOPs’ Failures: Fiduciary Duties When Managers of 
Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199, 
238-41 (2000). 
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underdiversified.  Investment in firm-specific physical capital may 
be more significant than in firm-specific human capital.  Employee 
ownership or control may discourage external takeovers, thus 
weakening that source of managerial discipline.  Employees as a 
group may have more divergent interests than shareholders as a 
group, and so employee involvement in governance may lead to 
high decision-making costs.42  Vesting authority in the board of 
directors may allow better coordination and monitoring of 
decisions, and effective vesting of authority may be inconsistent 
with mechanisms that subject the board to voting on its decisions.43 
In this article I do not try to weigh these various benefits and 
costs of employee governance.44  My concern here is with the 
comparison between corporate constituency statutes and employee 
governance.  Much support of the former seems to stem from a 
support for the latter.  I am sympathetic to the position that their 
effects are similar.  Indeed, I will note some arguments in its favor.  
It would appear that both the constituency statutes and employee 
governance are likely to have distributive effects that favor 
employees, although probably the effects are much stronger in the 
case of employee governance.  I also agree that employees often 
have a long-term stake in the success of their corporation that at 
least equals, and often much exceeds, the stake of shareholders.  
Moreover, employees may well be less able to protect those 
interests than are shareholders.  For instance, exit is generally 
much easier for shareholders than for employees, at least in public 
corporations. 
However, constituency statutes strike me as inferior to 
employee governance.  For one, where the statutes and employee 
governance do have similar effects, the latter is likely to have much 
stronger effects.  Thus, if increasing employees’ share of the 
surplus is desirable, then employee governance is likely to achieve 
this more than constituency statutes.  Of course, if one opposes 
increasing the share employees receive, this will make employee 
governance appear less attractive. 
Furthermore, in at least one important way constituency 
statutes and employee governance have different effects.  
 
 42. See Dow & Putterman, supra note 40, for an overview. 
 43. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 201-03. 
 44. Indeed, I am skeptical about our ability to do so in any systematic, 
persuasive way.  See Brett H. McDonnell, The Curious Incident of the Workers in the 
Boardroom, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503 (2000). 
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Constituency statutes make corporate managers less subject to 
disciplinary pressures.  They weaken the effect of hostile takeovers 
by helping managers defend against such takeovers.  Employee 
governance, in contrast, is a potentially powerful way of disciplining 
managers, as employees have much information about the 
effectiveness of managers as well as incentive to use that 
information.45  I should point out, though, that some argue that 
employee governance can have very high costs.46  I leave to another 
day discussion of the costs of employee governance.47 
III. THE BASIC MODEL 
One thing at least is clear about the matters discussed in the 
previous section.  More than just shareholders, managers, and the 
board of directors interact within a corporation.  We need to 
understand how these groups interact with others, and how 
interactions among these groups affect others.  The particular 
group on which I focus is employees.  Standard economic models 
of firms focus only on shareholders and managers, using a 
principal-agent model.  This clearly needs to be expanded.48  In this 
section I describe and analyze a simple formal model of the 
interaction among shareholders, employees, and managers.  Later 
sections expand the basic model to include the effects of takeover 
threats, employee involvement in governance, and constituency 
 
 45. The model in this article assumes employee involvement in corporate 
governance either through a significant ownership stake or else through board 
representation.  It does so by focusing on the ability of employees to replace 
managers.  Employee knowledge and interest, however, may actually be best used 
at a lower level of the firm.  I do not model such lower-level employee governance 
here.  Note that when I speak of an employee ownership share, I mean ownership 
of the firm in which they work.  Involvement in other firms, e.g., through union 
pension funds, does not fit this model. 
 46. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 89-92 (1996); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An 
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469 (1979); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique 
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997) (book 
review). 
 47. But see infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
 48. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990).  A notable exception is Jean Tirole, 
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organization, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 181 (1986).  Masahiko Aoki has presented a cooperative bargaining theory of 
the firm in which employees are featured.  See MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE 
GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984). 
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statutes. 
A firm in the basic model has three constituencies: a manager, 
shareholders, and employees.  Only the manager’s decisions are 
explicitly modeled; the reactions of shareholders and employees 
appear implicitly as effects of those decisions.  The manager makes 
two decisions, one of which is the manager’s effort level, x.49  A 
higher effort level leads to higher total output created by the firm, 
represented by Y.50  However, greater effort lowers the private 
benefits the manager receives, where B represents those benefits.51 
The other variable that the manager controls is the 
distribution of the output created by the firm.  The output is 
divided among the manager, shareholders, and employees.  The 
manager receives αY, the shareholders receive S = βY, where α and 
β are proportions, and the employees receive W = (1 - α - β)Y.  I 
assume that α is fixed and that the manager chooses β.  Both B and 
W may be unverifiable, as private benefits to managers and some of 
the surplus received by employees may take the form of job-related 
perks and conditions that are hard to measure. 
Although this article focuses on takeover threats, employee 
control, and constituency statutes as ways of controlling managers, 
there are of course other ways of providing incentives to managers 
to make decisions in the firm’s best interests.  These include 
managerial labor markets,52 reputation, and norms.53  I shall not 
model these and other mechanisms in detail.  Rather, I shall use a 
reduced form approach54 by assuming that the returns received by 
shareholders (S) and employees (W) affect the private benefits that 
the manager expects to receive (B).  For example, if shareholders 
 
 49. x > 0. 
 50. With dY/dx > 0 and d2Y/dx2 < 0 — the former condition merely says that 
Y increases as x increases, and the latter is a technical condition needed to ensure 
that the values given in the first order conditions below actually lead to maximum 
outputs, not minimum outputs. 
 51. With ∂B/∂x < 0 and ∂2B/∂x2 < 0 — these conditions are analogous to 
those in the previous footnote. 
 52. See Fama, supra note 38, at 292-95. 
 53. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1253 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=241403 (last visited May 16, 2004); 
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001). 
 54. That is, rather than explicitly modeling these other mechanisms, I shall 
just throw their assumed effects into the effects of S and W on B. 
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receive higher returns, then the manager will have a better 
reputation and be able to do better in the labor market.55  Similarly, 
if employees receive higher returns, then the manager will have 
better relations with her fellow employees, will be able to induce 
the employees to work harder, and will believe that she has better 
conformed with a norm of fair dealing.  Formally, I assume that B is 
a function of S and W as well as x (the manager’s effort level), with 
increases in either S or W leading to an increase in B.56  Given these 
returns, the manager will choose x and β to maximize B + αY, 
which is called the manager’s objective function. 
We want to consider how the manager will choose x and B 
given this objective function, and in later sections compare those 
choices with how she would set x and B in the presence of a 
takeover threat, constituency statute, or employee governance.  
The tool by which economists determine how such choices are 
made is called the first order condition—this defines the choices of 
x and B that maximize the manager’s objective function.  In Table 
1, I have collected the first order conditions for both this version of 
the model and for the variants on that model, which we shall 
explore in later sections.  For this basic version, the first order 
condition with respect to x is: 
 
  
   (1)        
 
We can get some perspective on this choice of x by comparing 
it with the social optimum.  Let us for now define the social 
optimum simply.57  Suppose that the social welfare function simply 
adds the private benefits received by the manager and the net 
output generated by the firm, B + Y.  Suppose further that the 
effects of S and W on B are simply distributional, and do not affect 
net welfare.  Then the social welfare problem is to choose x to 
maximize B(x) + Y(x).  The first order condition is: 
 
 (3)    
  
Comparing (1) with (3), several points emerge.  First, if α = 1, 
 
 55. See Fama, supra note 38, at 292-95. 
 56. That is, ∂B/∂S > 0 and ∂B/∂W > 0. 
 57. Later on we shall consider some complications based on distributional 
concerns.  Note that the optimum social welfare is the social optimum. 
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then the firm achieves the social optimum.  This is no surprise: in 
that case, the manager bears all costs and receives all the benefits.58  
I assume that wealth constraints and imperfect debt markets 
require that α < 1—that is, to fund the company the manager must 
bring in other shareholders.  Second, if ∂B/∂S = ∂B/∂W = 1, then 
the firm will again achieve the social optimum.  That is, if the 
mechanisms summed up by the effect of S and W on B succeed in 
making the manager fully internalize the effects her choices of x 
and β have on shareholders and employees, then we again achieve 
the social optimum.  I shall assume that those other mechanisms 
have some effect, but they are less than perfect.59  Given those two 
assumptions, the manager’s choice of x given by equation (1) will 
be less than the social optimum given by equation (3).  The 
manager bears the full private costs of effort (B), but gets only a 
fraction of the gains in output which that effort achieves.  Hence, 
she will work less hard than we would like her to work.  Thus, there 
is room for other mechanisms to help align the incentives of 
managers with the interests of the other two constituencies. 
The manager also must choose the distribution of output 
between shareholders and employees.  The first order condition of 
the manager’s objective function with respect to β is: 
 
(2) 
   
The manager equalizes the marginal effects of changes to the 
shareholders’ and employees’ shares on the private benefits that 
the manager receives.60 
IV. THE THREAT OF A TAKEOVER 
In the basic model of section III, the manager has an incentive 
to expend too little effort—that is, to set x too low.  In this section 
we consider the first of several possible additional mechanisms to 
 
 58. This is a standard result. 
 59. In particular, 0 < ∂B/∂S, ∂B/∂W < 1. 
 60. I assume that no side bargaining occurs among the manager, 
shareholders and employees, and I also set aside possible general equilibrium 
effects.  Such effects might limit the ability of those managers to set how much 
employees and shareholders actually receive.  I also assume that the amount 
received by employees and shareholders, and total output, are not observable by 
third parties, and thus a legally binding contract cannot be written that sets those 
levels.  This may be, for instance, because a part of the return that employees 
receive is the quality of their working conditions. 
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improve the incentives the manager faces.  This section introduces 
the threat that the firm may be taken over and the manager 
punished, e.g., by being fired.  The chances of a takeover are tied 
to the gains that shareholders receive: the higher the gain to 
shareholders (S), the lower the probability of a takeover. 
Formally, let p(S) be the probability of a takeover, with the 
probability decreasing as S increases.61  If there is no takeover, the 
manager’s return is as above.  If there is a takeover, then the 
manager is penalized by an amount P, i.e., her return is –P.62  The 
manager’s objective function is then (1 – p)(B + αY) – pP. 
The first order function giving the manager’s choice of effort 
level x is: 
 
   (5) 
 
 
 
 
While slightly complicated, (5) can be fairly easily compared 
with (1), the first order condition for x in the absence of a takeover 
threat.  For (5) to hold, it must be that x is greater than the x that 
satisfies (1).63  That is, the threat of a takeover induces the manager 
to choose a higher effort level x.  That is no surprise: because a 
takeover penalizes the manager, and because increasing x reduces 
the chances of a takeover, the takeover threat naturally induces the 
manager to set x higher than if the threat did not exist. 
The manager can also determine β.  How does the takeover 
threat affect that choice?  The new first order condition for 
choosing β is: 
 
(6) 
 
Because the right-hand side of (6) is negative and 1 – p is 
 
 61. That is, dp/dS < 0.  Note that the probability of a takeover with respect to 
shareholder gain is p(S), but for the sake of clarity, the variable S will be omitted 
hereinafter. 
 62. P > 0. 
 63. To see this, note that the bracketed expression on the right-hand side of 
(5) contains (1).  Since the left hand side of (5) is negative, and 1 – p > 0, for (5) 
to hold we must have: ∂B/∂x < β*∂B/∂S +((1 - α - β)∂B/∂W)dY/dx.  Given the 
second order conditions for B(x) and Y(x), this can happen only if x is greater 
than the x that satisfies (1). 
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positive, for (6) to hold we must have ∂B/∂S < ∂B/∂W. 
Comparing this with (2), the condition for choosing β with no 
takeover threat, and again taking into account the second order 
conditions, we see that the share that shareholders receive must be 
set relatively higher with the threat of a takeover than without, 
meaning that the share that employees receive must be lower.  
Again, this makes sense.  The manager wants to reduce the threat 
of a takeover, and because the probability of a takeover is tied to 
how much shareholders receive, the takeover threat induces the 
manager to increase the relative share of output given to 
shareholders. 
The threat of a takeover thus has divergent effects on the three 
constituencies.  Shareholders are better off: the total output of the 
firm increases, and their share of that output also increases.  
Managers are worse off: a takeover, if it occurs, makes them worse 
off, and in response they devote more effort to increasing firm 
output than they would if they did not face that threat. 
The effect on employees of the takeover threat is ambiguous.  
On the one hand, the threat increases the total firm output 
available to be divided up among the constituencies.  On the other 
hand, their share of that output decreases.  Either effect could 
predominate. 
What can we say about social welfare as a result of the takeover 
threat?  We saw in the previous section that in the absence of such a 
threat the manager sets effort too low.  The takeover threat 
increases the manager’s effort.  Thus, at least for a low probability 
of takeover, the manager’s effort level is closer to the social 
optimum as a result of the takeover threat.  However, there are at 
least three caveats to that statement. 
First, the statement ignores P.  If P is merely a redistributional 
effect rather than a deadweight social loss, that may be acceptable.64  
If P is a deadweight social loss, then we must revise the social 
welfare function to equal B + Y – pP.  The comparison of the social 
optimum with what the manager chooses is then more 
complicated. 
Second, with a higher probability of a takeover, the incentive 
can overshoot—that is, the takeover threat can induce the manager 
to choose x higher than the social optimum. 
Third, society may care about distributional effects.  As used so 
 
 64. Although, see the third caveat in the text below. 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/1
MCDONNELL-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  7:23 PM 
2004]                             CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY                           1247 
far, the social welfare function simply adds the amounts received by 
the three constituencies.  We may, however, care about who 
receives the net product.  For instance, if employees are typically 
less wealthy than shareholders, and we value income equality, then 
a mechanism that increases total wealth created but decreases the 
amount that employees receive may not be attractive.65 
V. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AS A SHIELD 
The threat of a takeover makes the manager worse off.  She is 
thus willing to take action to reduce or eliminate that threat.  This 
action may itself be costly, e.g., by diverting some of the manager’s 
time and attention that could otherwise be spent on productive 
activity.  Reductions in the probability of a takeover, either 
achieved by such action or exogenously, will lessen the effects 
analyzed in the previous subsection.  The existence and contours of 
a court-imposed fiduciary duty on the manager is one factor 
affecting the probability of a takeover.  If courts impose a strict 
fiduciary duty that discourages antitakeover defenses, then the 
probability of a takeover will be higher and the manager will be 
able to lower that probability less with a given expenditure of effort.  
A weak fiduciary duty has the opposite effect. 
Suppose the manager can choose to expend d66 on putting in 
place takeover defenses that reduce the possibility of a takeover.  
The probability of a takeover, p(d, S), is now a function of 
expenditure on d as well as the return to shareholders, with the 
probability of a takeover decreasing as the manager spends more 
on d.67 
The manager now chooses x, β, and d to maximize (1 – p)(B + 
αY) – pP – d.  The first order condition with respect to d is -
∂p/∂d(B + αY + P) = 1. 
 
 65. Law and economics scholars often argue that we should use tax policy to 
achieve whatever distribution of income we desire.  Other legal policies, including 
corporate law, should be set only to maximize efficiency.  The argument is that tax 
policy redistributes income at less cost to efficiency than do other policies.  See 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income 
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).  However, recent work 
calls this argument into question.  See Chris W. Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New 
Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); see also Daniel A. Farber & 
Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1824-26 (2003). 
 66. d > 0. 
 67. ∂p/∂d < 0 and ∂2p/∂d2 < 0. 
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Now, imagine that a change in fiduciary duty rules makes it 
easier for the manager to block a takeover with a given level of 
expenditure—the (probably weak) effect of current constituency 
statutes.  Formally this means that |∂p/∂d| is greater for a given d; 
that is, a change in d has a greater effect on decreasing p, the 
probability of a takeover.  From the above first order condition and 
the fact that ∂2p/∂d2 < 0, this implies that the manager’s optimal 
choice of d will increase.  As a result, the probability of a takeover 
will decrease.  This makes sense: if it becomes easier to block a 
takeover, the manager will spend more on avoiding a takeover. 
This change in fiduciary duty has two effects on the social 
surplus.  First, the increase in d is a direct social cost.  Second, 
there is the effect induced by the decreased probability of a 
takeover.  From the previous subsection we saw that a lower 
probability of a takeover means that the manager chooses a lower 
level of effort.  This lowers the social surplus.  It also reduces the 
manager’s incentive to transfer a greater share of the surplus to 
shareholders.  Thus, shareholders are unambiguously hurt by the 
weakening of the fiduciary duty.  The effect on employees is 
ambiguous: they will get a bigger share of a smaller pie. 
VI. EMPLOYEE GOVERNANCE 
Now consider the possibility of employee governance as a 
mechanism for checking managerial opportunism.  Suppose that if 
employees are dissatisfied with their return they might replace the 
manager.  This may be because they have enough votes on the 
board to remove the manager or possibly through the threat of a 
leveraged buyout, perhaps financed through an employee stock 
ownership plan, to take control of the firm. 
The model of how this threat works is formally very similar to 
the model of a takeover threat in section IV.  Let q(W) be the 
probability that employees remove the manager, with that 
probability decreasing as employees’ share of output increases.68  If 
there is no removal, the manager’s return is as in section II.  If 
employees remove the manager, then the manager receives a 
return of –P.69  The manager’s objective function is then (1 –q)(B + 
 
 68. dq/dW < 0. Note that although the probability that employees will 
remove the manager is q(W), for clarity, the variable W will be omitted 
hereinafter. 
 69. P > 0. 
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αY) – qP. 
The first order condition with respect to x is: 
   
 
(7) 
 
 
 
We should compare (7) with (1), the first order condition for 
the choice of effort in the absence of a takeover threat and 
employee governance, and with (5), the first order condition for 
choosing effort with a takeover threat.  By the same argument as 
with the comparison of (5) with (1), the threat of employee 
removal induces the manager to choose a higher effort level x than 
if there is no such threat and no takeover threat.70  The intuition is 
also the same: the manager will work harder to increase output, 
and hence how much the employees receive, and thereby reduce 
the chances of being fired.71  It is less straightforward to compare 
the choice of effort under the threat of employee removal as 
opposed to under the threat of a takeover—it depends on the 
relative responsiveness of p and q (the probabilities of removal) to 
changes in S or W (the amount of output received by shareholders 
or employees). 
The manager can also set β.  The first order condition for this 
choice under the threat of employee removal is: 
 
(8) 
 
 
Because the right-hand side of (8) is negative and 1 – q is 
positive, for (8) to hold we must have ∂B/∂W < ∂B/∂S. 
Comparing this with (2), the condition for choosing β with no 
takeover or employee removal threat, and with (6), which holds 
under the threat of a takeover, and taking into account the second 
order conditions, we see that the share that employees receive must 
be set relatively higher with the threat of employee removal than if 
neither threat exists, and the employee share is higher with neither 
threat than with a threat of a takeover.  Managers want to reduce 
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the threat of being removed.  When that threat comes from 
employees, they see that employees get more of the firm’s surplus; 
when the threat comes from shareholders, managers give them a 
greater share of the pie.72 
The threat of employee removal is thus the mirror image of 
the takeover threat analyzed in section IV.  It has mirror effects on 
the three constituencies in our model.  Employees are now better 
off than with no threat: the total output of the firm increases, and 
their share of that output also increases.  Managers are worse off: 
employee removal, if it occurs, negatively affects managers, and in 
response they put forth more effort than they would in the absence 
of a threat.  The effect on shareholders is ambiguous as compared 
with the case of no threat: total firm output is higher due to the 
threat of removal, but the shareholder share of that output 
decreases. 
VII. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AS A SWORD 
Finally, consider a different possible application of the 
fiduciary duty concept.  In section V the manager’s fiduciary duty 
was considered insofar as it affected the manager’s ability to defend 
against a takeover threat.  The fiduciary duty concept could instead 
be applied directly to the manager’s decision-making within the 
firm.  If either shareholders or employees believe that the manager 
has behaved in a way that does not maximize returns to the firm, 
they could sue and seek to have the manager disgorge her gains.  
Assuming that employees can sue goes beyond current corporate 
constituency statutes, which do not grant standing to employees.73 
The formal model of this possibility is similar to that for the 
takeover threat and the threat of removal by employees.  Suppose 
that with some probability the manager will be found guilty of a 
violation of fiduciary duty, r(Y).74  An individual shareholder or 
employee chooses whether or not to sue the manager for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  The probability of liability is a decreasing function 
of the surplus generated by the firm, Y.75  If the manager is found 
liable she is penalized by an amount, L; otherwise, she receives the 
 
 72. See generally Mitchell, supra note 26. 
 73. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 74. Note that although the function r(Y) is the probability that the manager 
will be found guilty of a fiduciary duty violation, for clarity, the variable Y will be 
omitted hereinafter. 
 75. Thus, dr/dY < 0, and d2r/dY2 < 0. 
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managerial return as defined in section III. 
The manager’s objective function is now (1 – r)(B + αY) – rL.  
The first order function with respect to x is: 
 
(9) 
 
 
 
Comparing (9) with (1), the first order condition in the 
absence of a threat of suit, takeover, or employee removal, we see 
by the same logic as with (5) and (7) above that (9) results in a 
higher choice of effort, x, and hence higher firm output, Y.76  
Again, the choice of x in the presence of the threat of a lawsuit is 
trickier as compared with the choice of x under the takeover and 
employee removal threats, depending on the relative 
responsiveness of p, q, and r to changes in the amount received. 
The other choice variable is the share that employees receive.  
The first order condition for this is: 
 
(10) 
 
Expression (10) is the same expression as (2), which gives the 
distributive choice in the absence of any of the three threats 
considered in the elaborations of the basic model.77  That is, unlike 
the takeover and employee removal threats, the lawsuit threat 
considered here does not induce the manager to shift the 
distribution of the surplus from employees to shareholders or vice 
versa.  That is because in this model, both shareholders and 
employees can sue for a violation of fiduciary duty.  The chances of 
getting sued only depend on the total income produced, Y, not on 
how much goes to either of the two constituencies.  Note how this 
varies from current practice.  As things stand, only shareholders 
can sue for a violation of fiduciary duty.  One would thus expect 
this to induce managers to transfer income to shareholders.  
Expanded constituency statutes that gave employees standing to 
sue as well would change that effect. 
Although formally similar (in this model) to the threats of 
 
 76. See supra notes 62 and 69 and accompanying text. 
 77. The first order condition is actually –dr/dβ(B + αY) + (1 – r)(∂B/∂W + 
∂B/∂S)Y – dr/dβ*L = 0.  However, since r depends only on Y and changing β does 
not affect Y in this model, dr/dβ = 0 and this expression reduces to (10). 
( ) =++










 LYB
dx
dY
dY
dr α
( ) ( ) 











∂
∂
−−+
∂
∂
++
∂
∂
−
dx
dY
W
B
S
B
x
Br βαβα 11
S
B
W
B
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
25
McDonnell: Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
MCDONNELL-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  7:23 PM 
1252 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
takeover and removal by employee, there are a variety of reasons to 
expect that this use of fiduciary law would add less to the 
disciplining of managers.  First, the penalty imposed on the 
manager is typically weaker, i.e., L < P.78  Second, courts are 
generally reluctant to find liability in managerial operating 
decisions, a reluctance doctrinally expressed by the business 
judgment rule.79  Formally, this means that r is likely to be near 0.  
Third, if courts are not very good at determining whether a 
manager’s actions have subtracted value from the firm, then the 
probability of liability will not be very responsive to performance, 
i.e., ∂r/∂Y is likely to be small.  Of course, these effects also imply 
that while the fiduciary duty check is unlikely to act as a strong 
deterrent, it is also less likely to over-deter and induce a higher- 
than-optimal effort level, a risk that all three mechanisms share in 
theory. 
One must compare the costs of the mechanisms as well as their 
benefits.  The takeover mechanism involves monitoring by outside 
takeover specialists of many potential targets, plus the considerable 
costs involved in the takeover itself.  Moreover, managers may 
engage in costly defensive actions that reduce the chances of a 
takeover without increasing output.  Monitoring costs of employee 
governance may be relatively low, as employees monitor how 
managers are performing as a byproduct of doing their jobs, but 
employees may face significant collective action costs in 
coordinating their decision-making,80 and there may be influence 
costs as managers lobby employees to preserve their jobs.81  
Litigation costs are the most obvious cost for the fiduciary duty 
mechanism.  There may also be some costs in monitoring and 
searching for firms where suits have a good chance of success, 
although allowing employees to sue may reduce these costs 
considerably.  The legal mechanism reduces or eliminates the 
collective action issues that occur for the removal mechanism.  The 
legal mechanism may create some incentive to take costly action to 
reduce the chance of a suit, although offhand this would seem a 
 
 78. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.3 (2000). 
 79. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 269-86. 
 80. The problem arises because employees typically have more diverse 
interests in the corporation than do shareholders, and hence more cause for 
dispute.  See HANSMANN, supra note 46, at 89-92. 
 81. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the 
Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
(J. Alt & K. Shepsle eds., 1990). 
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less-serious problem than the comparable incentives arising under 
the other two mechanisms.  Thus, it seems the legal mechanism is 
likely to provide low expected benefits, but also low costs, as 
compared to the other two. 
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Theoretical analyses like those in sections III through VII 
above, without more, prove nothing about the real world.  I hope 
the models presented are suggestive, however.  In particular, I 
hope to have suggested the following points. 
A.  Economic models should take into account a variety of stakeholder 
groups beyond managers and shareholders. 
Although in theory the nexus of contracts approach to the 
corporation82 recognizes that many different groups interact 
through the corporate form, most formal models of the 
corporation use a principal/agent framework that focuses on 
managers as the agents of shareholders and ignores employees.  
Separate models treat employees as agents of the firm.  Modeling 
needs to go beyond this framework and consider the simultaneous 
interaction of managers, shareholders, and employees.  The 
models of sections III through VII have considered how executive 
compensation, takeover threats, fiduciary duty, and employee 
governance may affect the behavior of shareholders, managers, and 
employees, and in turn how the equilibrium outcomes affect the 
payoffs that those three parties receive.  The model used is quite 
simple, and merely illustrative.  Although some work has gone 
beyond the shareholder/manager model,83 more needs to be done. 
B.   Although most commentators have concluded that transfers from 
employees are not an important factor in hostile takeovers, that 
issue is far from conclusively decided. 
After Shleifer and Summers suggested that observed 
shareholder gains from takeovers may be explained in part by 
losses to other stakeholders, and in particular employees of target 
corporations, a relatively modest amount of empirical literature has 
 
 82. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra note 48. 
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examined this point.84  The widely believed verdict on this point is 
that transfers from employees or other stakeholder groups to 
shareholders are small to nonexistent.  In the case of employees, 
the literature has mainly focused on data concerning employment 
and wage levels, finding little evidence of drops in either as a 
response to hostile takeovers. 
The model presented here raises at least two questions about 
this conclusion.  First, it may well be the threat of hostile takeovers, 
rather than the actual occurrence of takeovers, has the main effect.  
Note that it is this threat of takeovers, rather than the actual 
aftermath of a finished takeover, on which the above models focus.  
Testing the effect of threatened takeovers on employees rather 
than executed takeovers is much harder, and I do not believe it has 
been done yet.  Second, the harm to employees may come not in 
layoffs or wage cuts, but rather in uncompensated or 
undercompensated worsening of employment conditions—harder 
work, longer hours, less generous training, and so on.  The only 
paper I am aware of that has tried to test for such harms has found 
a significant effect.85  The variable used in that paper is crude 
enough that the result is far from conclusive, but it is at least 
suggestive. 
C.  There is a redistributive argument in favor of a fiduciary duty 
favoring employees. 
If one finds the previous point plausible, namely that takeovers 
and takeover threats can harm employees, then it is not clear that 
fiduciary duties should run only in favor of shareholders.  Sections 
III through V found that managerial opportunism can reduce the 
total surplus, that the takeover threat can limit this effect, and 
hence that a weakened fiduciary duty that allows managers to 
defend against takeovers more easily will tend to reduce the total 
social surplus.  However, because the takeover threat may hurt 
employees, the revised fiduciary duty may help them by reducing 
that takeover threat.  If one is firmly convinced in the goal of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and nothing else, then so what?  However, 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, more than Pareto efficiency, can be 
questioned as a social goal.  This is particularly true where 
efficiency suggests a scheme that benefits shareholders at the 
 
 84. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Becker, supra note 343. 
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expense of employees, given that shareholders are on average 
wealthier than employees.  Although the standard law and 
economics line is that redistributive goals should be ignored in a 
policy area such as this, and instead pursued through tax and 
transfer instruments, this line has come under some attack.86 
D.  While a revised fiduciary duty and increased employee governance 
may both help tilt the playing field toward employees, the revised 
fiduciary duty does so at the cost of lessened discipline of managers, 
while employee governance provides a new tool for strengthening the 
discipline of managers. 
Although I am not nearly as opposed to constituency statutes 
as many writers on the subject, they do strike me as problematic.  
The problem is that their main effect is loosening court-imposed 
discipline on corporate managers.  Although this may help 
employees in the takeover context,87 the statutes come at a cost.  
True, a revised fiduciary duty could be used outside the takeover 
context to affirmatively push managers to take actions that favor 
groups other than just shareholders (as modeled in section VII).  
However, for a variety of practical reasons this use of the 
constituency statutes seems unlikely.  Not only does the business 
judgment rule and the limited capacity of courts work against it, 
but the limits of the statutes themselves also strongly discourage 
this use.88 
In contrast, employee involvement in corporate governance 
works as a potentially powerful additional mechanism to control 
managerial opportunism and to direct the corporation toward 
greater efficiency.  Employees have an abundance of information 
on the functioning of the corporation and managers, and 
incentives to use that information to improve the corporation’s 
performance, if given a way to do so.89  Although a variety of 
mechanisms exist to limit managerial opportunism, this is a 
potentially powerful alternative with much to commend it.  This is 
not to deny the many objections to employee involvement in 
governance, nor to try to resolve the numerous issues that arise in 
 
 86. See supra note 65. 
 87. As mentioned above, the effect of these statutes has actually been, in all 
likelihood, quite limited, either for good or for bad. 
 88. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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considering it.90  That goes beyond the bounds of this article.  My 
point here is simply that employee governance is potentially a 
much more powerful and useful reform than corporate 
constituency statutes.  Still, if employee involvement in corporate 
governance is otherwise undesirable or politically infeasible, and if 
the distributive effect of takeovers on employees is of great 
concern, constituency statutes may be defensible.  I do not believe 
there is currently enough systematic evidence of a strong negative 
effect of takeovers on employees for this argument to persuade me, 
on balance. 
To restate the basic point: the threat of a takeover serves to 
discipline managerial opportunism.  However, it also makes 
managers shift returns to shareholders from other groups, such as 
employees, because a high return to shareholders reduces the 
probability of a takeover.  Constituency statutes, to the extent they 
do anything, reduce the distributive effect of takeovers by reducing 
the probability of takeovers, and thus also reduce the positive 
disciplinary effect takeovers provide.  Employee governance can 
function like a takeover threat to impose discipline on managers.  
Unlike takeovers, employee governance induces managers to shift 
returns from shareholders to employees, as high returns to 
employees become more important to managers’ well-being.  Thus, 
employee governance may achieve the distributive shift from 
shareholders to employees that justifies constituency statutes, with 
lower managerial misbehavior. 
I realize that I have not gone into much detail in this article as 
to exactly what I mean by employee governance.  As noted earlier,91 
the formal model focuses mainly on forms of governance that give 
employees the ability to remove managers.  Thus, employee 
representation on the board of directors, or forms of large-scale 
employee ownership that allow employees to vote for the board, are 
what I have in mind here.  These forms of employee governance 
are especially attractive if one believes that employees, through 
their daily activities, naturally gain pertinent information about the 
performance of high-level managers.  If one instead believes that 
employees have a particular advantage in information that is most 
useful at lower levels of decision-making, then other forms of 
employee governance, such as works councils or quality circles, may 
 
 90. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra note 45. 
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be more attractive.  These different forms of employee governance 
may also differ in their costs.  I will have to tackle those issues in a 
later article. 
I should mention one argument that is sometimes made in 
defense of constituency statutes.  Even after acknowledging their 
limits, supporters sometimes argue that the statutes may help to 
move values and beliefs in the direction of greater involvement of 
employees and other stakeholders in corporate governance.92  This 
argument fits with a recent spate of work on the norm-influencing 
effects of law.93  This is not the place to evaluate that work.  
However, at least in the context of constituency statutes, any effect 
of those statutes on popular beliefs or values is certainly very far 
from proven.  I find it hard to believe that relatively obscure 
corporate law statutes, which have been very rarely invoked in 
practice, have had or will have much influence on public norms. 
Scholars and activists who yearn for greater employee 
involvement in corporate governance should advocate measures 
that successfully accomplish this goal.  Whether this should be 
through private or public initiative, or indeed whether it is 
ultimately an attractive goal at all, are questions I leave for another 
day.  However, telling corporate managers that they should, or may, 
take employee interests into account does nothing to make 
employees themselves actually more involved in decision-making.  
Nor do other arguments, on balance, make a compelling case in 
favor of corporate constituency statutes. 
 
 
 
 92. See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 641-43; Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, 
Employees As Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON 
L. REV. 45, 69-72(1991). 
 93. For examples in the corporate law area, see supra note 53. 
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Table 1: First Order Conditions for Choice of x and β in 
Various Versions of the Model 
Basic version: 
Choice of x 
(1) 
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Table 2: Variables, Functions, and their Values 
 
Variable Represents 
x Manager’s Effort Level 
Y Firm Output 
B Private Benefits Manager Receives 
W Benefits Employees Receive 
S Benefits Shareholders Receive 
P Amount Manager is Penalized if a Take-Over 
Occurs 
L Amount Manager is Penalized if Found Liable for 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
d Amount Manager Spends on Implementing 
Takeover Defenses 
Function Represents 
q(W) Probability that Employees Remove Manager 
r(Y) Probability that Manager will be Found Guilty of a 
Fiduciary Duty  Violation 
p(S) Probability of a Takeover 
p(d, S) Probability of a Takeover if a Manager is Able to 
Implement Takeover Defenses 
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